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THE TORTURE WARRANT: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR STRAUSS
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ*
Professor Strauss characterizes me as "figuring most promi-
nently in [the] debate" over whether torture "would be justified to
prevent mass casualties . .. [the] 'ticking bomb scenario."' 1 She
says that I have "seemingly advocated the use of torture in certain
very limited circumstances." 2 In light of how much I have written
about this issue, Strauss's use of the word "seemingly" is surprising.3
But at least she does not claim, as others have, that I advocate "cir-
cumventing constitutional prohibitions on torture,"4 that I have
given "thumbs up to torture," that I have "proposed torture for cap-
tured terrorist leaders,"5 that I believe "U.S. agencies should be ac-
corded the right to torture those suspected of withholding
information in a terrorist case," 6 and that I "advocate ... shoving a
sterilized needle under the fingernails of those subjects being inter-
rogated." One reviewer has even called me "Torquemada Dersho-
witz," a reference to the notorious torturer of the Inquisition. 7 No
one, however, reminded readers that it was the liberal Jeremy Ben-
tham who made the most powerful utilitarian case for limited tor-
ture of convicted criminals to gather information necessary to
* Alan M. Dershowitz is the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School. L.L.B. Yale Law School, 1986; A.B. Brooklyn College, 1959.
1. Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y. LAw SCH. L. REv. 203, 207 (2004).
2. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
3. See infra note 15.
4. Brendon O'Leary, In Defence of the Indefensible, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION SUP-
PLEMENT, Oct. 4, 2002, at 23.
5. Jed Babbin, The Silence of the Lambs: Torture is Not Apprepriate Treatment for Ter-
rorists, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at A19.
6. Paul William Roberts, September 11: Islamists and Their Enemies, GLOBE & MAIL,
September 7, 2002 at, D2 (book review).
7. Babbin, supra note 5, at A19. ("Torquemada Dershowitz then defines the lib-
eral view of 'permissible' torture, saying that it would be limited to 'nonlethal means,
such as sterile needles, being inserted beneath the nails to cause excruciating pain with-
out endangering life.'").
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prevent serious future crime.8 Perhaps the most surprising mis-
characterization of my actual position on torture comes from Judge
Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit. He alleged that I "recommend . . . that suspected
terrorists be tortured for information by having needles stuck
under their fingernails . . ." a suggestion that he characterizes as
"tinged with sadism."1 0 He also said, in his generally positive review
of my book, Why Terrorism Works, that there "is no discussion" of
alternatives such as "truth serums" in the book.'" There is, how-
ever, a lengthy discussion of truth serum in a textual footnote that
Posner apparently missed: "Let's start with truth serum."1 2 Follow-
ing a legal analysis of the use of these drugs, it continues, "what if
truth serum doesn't work?"' 3 Only then does it introduce the idea
of a "torture warrant."
1 4
Anyone who actually bothers to read my writings on tor-
ture, 15 and especially the detailed chapter in Why Terrorism
8. SeeJeremy Bentham, Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain, How to be Measured, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Clarendon Press 1907),
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML4.html (last visited Oc-
tober 9, 2003). Bentham outlines in broad strokes what has come to be known as "feli-
cific calculus." His basic argument is that happiness can be calculated and quantified
mathematically based on a wide variety of variables. According to Bentham's formula, if
an act results in the "pleasure" of the many it is generally good even if it results in the
infliction of pain upon the individual; "[t]ake the balance which if on the side of plea-
sure, will give the general good tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or
community of individuals concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency,
with respect to the same community." In other words, it is acceptable to inflict pain and
suffering on the few so long as the wants and needs of the many are served.
9. Richard A. Posner, The Best Offense, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28.
10. Id.
11. Id.




15. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, German Issue Is One For U.S. Too: Can Torture, Or
The Threat Of It, Be Right?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at B15; Alan M. Dershowitz, A
Challenge to House Master Hanson, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 2, 2002, at 9; Alan M. Dersho-
witz, The Public Must Know If Torture Is Used, AGE, Mar. 15, 2003, at 9; Alan M. Dersho-
witz, Warrant Would Make Those Using Torture Accountable, FIN TIMES, June 8, 2002, at 8;
Alan M. Dershowitz, Yes, It Should Be 'On The Books', BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at
AI5; Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at
A19 (I did not choose or approve the headlines for these articles.) But cf David Abel,
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Works, 16 will quickly see that each of the descriptions of my propos-
als is categorically false. Since I pride myself on writing quite
clearly and have never shied away from expressing controversial
views unambiguously, I suspect that at least some of these mis-
characterizations have been quite deliberate.
Although Strauss comes closer to the truth than most, she too
confuses my empirical observations (what I think will happen as a
matter of fact) with my normative proposals (what I think should
happen as a matter of morality). Let me once again - for perhaps
the dozenth time - state my actual views on torture, so that no one
can any longer feign confusion about where I stand, though I am
certain the "confusion" will persist among some who are deter-
mined to argue that I am a disciple of Torquemada.
17
I am generally against torture as a normative matter, and I
would like to see its use minimized. I believe that at least moderate
forms of non-lethal torture are in fact being used by the United
States and some of its allies today. 18 I think that if we ever con-
fronted an actual case of imminent mass terrorism that could be
prevented by the infliction of torture we would use torture, (even
lethal torture), and the public would favor its use. That is my em-
pirical conclusion. It is either true or false, and time will probably
tell.
I then present my conditional normative position, which is the
central point of my chapter on torture. 9 I pose the issue as follows:
If torture is in fact being used and/or would in fact be used in an
actual ticking bomb mass terrorism case, would it be normatively bet-
ter or worse to have such torture regulated by some kind of war-
rant, with accountability, record-keeping, standards, and
limitations.20 This is an important debate, and a different one from
Dershowitz Makes Case For Antiterror Measures, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2002, at C8; Melissa
Radler, Enrolling in Anti-Semitism 101, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 6, 2002, at C8.
16. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 131-64.
17. See Babbin, supra note 5.
18. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 134-64.
19. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 134-64.
20. Although my specific proposal is for a judicial warrant, my general point re-
lates to visibility and accountability. Accordingly, an executive warrant or an explicit
executive approval would also serve these democratic values. Ajudicial warrant has the
added virtue of a decision-maker who - at least in theory - is supposed to balance
liberty and security concerns. A legislative warrant for specific cases would be both
2003l
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the old, abstract Benthamite debate over whether torture can ever
be justified. It is not so much about the substantive issue of torture,
as it is over accountability, visibility, and candor in a democracy that
is confronting a choice of evils. For example, William Schulz, the
Executive Director of Amnesty International USA, asks whether I
would favor "brutality warrants," "testilying warrants" and "prisoner
rape warrants."2 1 Although I strongly oppose brutality, testilying,
and prisoner rape, I answered Schulz with "a heuristic 'yes,' if re-
quiring a warrant would subject these horribly brutal activities to
judicial control and accountability."2 2 In explaining my preference
for a warrant, I wrote the following:
The purpose of requiring judicial supervision, as the
Framers of our Fourth Amendment understood better
than Schulz does, is to assure accountability and judicial
neutrality. There is another purpose as well: It forces a
democratic country to confront the choice of evils in an
open way. My question back to Schulz is, Do you prefer
the current situation, in which brutality, testilying and
prison rape are rampant, but we close our eyes to these
evils?
There is, of course, a downside: legitimating a horri-
ble practice that we all want to see ended or minimized.
Thus we have a triangular conflict unique to democratic
societies: If these horrible practices continue to operate
below the radar screen of accountability, there is no legiti-
mation, but there is continuing and ever-expanding sub
rosa employment of the practice. If we try to control the
practice by demanding some kind of accountability, we
add a degree of legitimation to it while perhaps reducing
its frequency and severity. If we do nothing, and a pre-
ventable act of nuclear terrorism occurs, then the public
will demand that we constrain liberty even more. There is
no easy answer.
I praise Amnesty International for taking the high
road-that is its job, because it is not responsible for mak-
cumbersome and violative of the spirit of the Bill of Attainder Clause, though a general
legislative enactment requiring judicial or executive approval would be desirable.
21. Alan Dershowitz, Torture "Off the Books"?, NATION, June 10, 2002, at 2 (Letter




ing hard judgments about choices of evil. Responsible
government officials are in a somewhat different position.
Professors have yet a different responsibility: to provoke
debate about issues before they occur and to challenge
absolutes.
23
That is my position! I cannot state it any more clearly, and no intel-
ligent and honest commentator should have any difficulty under-
standing it.
The strongest argument against my preference for candor and
accountability is the claim that it is better for torture - or any
other evil practice deemed necessary during emergencies - to be
left to the low visibility discretion of low level functionaries than to
be legitimated by high level, accountable decision makers. Posner
makes this argument, without offering much to support it:
Dershowitz believes that the occasions for the use of tor-
ture should be regularized - by requiring a judicial war-
rant for the needle treatment, for example. But he
overlooks an argument for leaving such things to execu-
tive discretion. If rules are promulgated permitting tor-
ture in defined circumstances, some officials are bound to
want to explore the outer bounds of the rules. Having
been regularized, the practice will become regular. Bet-
ter to leave in place the formal and customary prohibi-
tions, but with the understanding that they will not be
enforced in extreme circumstances.
2 4
The classic formulation of this argument was offered by Justice
Robert Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Korematsu:
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army pro-
gram for deporting and detaining these citizens of Japa-
nese extraction. But a judicial construction of the due
process clause that will sustain this order is a far more
subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order
itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not
apt to last longer than the military emergency. Even dur-
ing that period a succeeding commander may revoke it
all. But once ajudicial opinion rationalizes such an order
23. Id.
24. Posner, supra note 9, at 28.
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NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather
rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitu-
tion sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for
the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausi-
ble claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that
principle more deeply in our law and thinking and ex-
pands it to new purposes. All who observe the work of
courts are familiar with what Judge Cardozo described as
'the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of
its logic.' A military commander may overstep the
bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if
we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the
doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative
power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own
image.
2 5
Experience has not necessarily proved Jackson's fear or Pos-
ner's prediction to be well founded. The very fact that the Su-
preme Court expressly validated the detentions contributed to its
condemnation by the verdict of history. Today, the Supreme
Court's decision in Korematsu stands alongside decisions such as
Dred Scott,2 6 Plessy v. Ferguson,2 7 and Buck v. Bell2 8 in the High
Court's Hall of Infamy. 29 Though never formally overruled, and
even occasionally cited,30 Korematsu serves as a negative precedent
25. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
26. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
27. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 j1896).
28. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
29. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Move-
ments on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2152, n.458
(2002); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 631 n.4
(2001); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003); Roberta
M. Berry, From Involuntary Sterilization to Genetic Enhancement: The Unsettled Legacy of Buck
v. Bell, 12 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1998); Suzanne Sangree, Control of
Childbearing By HIV-Positive Women: Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies, 41 BUFF. L.
REV. 309, 321-22 (1993); Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding The Pos-
sibilities of Judicial Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REv. 3, 21 (1993).




- a mistaken ruling not ever to be repeated in future cases. Had
the Supreme Court merely allowed the executive decision to stand
withoutjudicial review, a far more dangerous precedent might have
been established: namely, that executive decisions during times of
emergency will escape review by the Supreme Court. That far
broader and more dangerous precedent, espoused by Posner,
would then lie about "like a loaded weapon" ready to be used by a
dictator without fear of judicial review.
A second argument against my position is Strauss's assertion -
with no supporting evidence - that "a warrant procedure likely
would be an invitation to increasing use of torture. ' 31 This, of
course, is an empirical claim, which, if true, would cause me to re-
consider my proposal, since my goal is to cabin the use of torture.
Other critics of a warrant requirement have exactly the opposite
concern: they fear that requiring judicial approval will deter agents
from employing effective preventative means in situations where
they may be warranted. These critics point to the FBI's refusal to
seek a national security warrant in the Moussaui case prior to Sep-
tember 11, 2001.32
My own belief is that a warrant requirement, if properly en-
forced, would probably reduce the frequency, severity, and dura-
tion of torture. I cannot see how it could possibly increase it, since
a warrant requirement simply imposes an additional level of prior
review. As I argued in Why Terrorism Works, two examples demon-
strate why I think there would be less torture with a warrant require-
ment than without one. First, recall the case of the alleged national
security wiretap being placed on the phones of Martin Luther King
by the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s. 33 This was in the
days when the attorney general could authorize a national security
wiretap without a warrant. Today, no judge would issue a warrant
in a case as flimsy as that one. Indeed, no law enforcement agent
would even request one. Second, when Zaccarias Moussaui was de-
tained after trying to learn how to fly an airplane, without wanting
to know much about landing it, the government did not even seek a
national security wiretap because its lawyers believed that a judge
31. Strauss, supra note 1, at 275.
32. This is a complicated matter. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 244.
33. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 159-60.
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would not have granted one.34 If Moussaui's computer could have
been searched without a warrant, it almost certainly would have
been.
It should be recalled that in the context of searches, the fram-
ers of our Fourth Amendment opted for a judicial check on the
discretion of the police, by requiring a search warrant in most
cases. 35 The Court has explained the reason for the warrant re-
quirement as follows: "The informed and deliberate determina-
tions of magistrates... are to be preferred over the hurried actions
of officers."3 6 Justice Jackson elaborated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law en-
forcement the support of the usual inferences, which rea-
sonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often-competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient
to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to
issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a
search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment
to nullify and leave the people' homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers.
37
Although torture is very different from a search, the policies under-
lying the warrant requirement are relevant to whether there is likely
to be more or less torture if the decision were left entirely to field
officers, or if ajudicial officer had to approve a request for a torture
warrant. As Mark Twain once observed: "To a man with a hammer,
34. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 159-60. The argument that judges today hand
out national security warrants in every instance in which one is sought ignores the fact
that the warrant requirement may reduce the number of instances in which agents seek
a warrant.
35. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). The Fourth Amendment pro-
vides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
36. Lejkowitz, 285 U.S. at 464.
37. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
[Vol. 48
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everything looks like a nail." If the man with the hammer must get
judicial approval before he can use it, he will probably use it less
often and more carefully.
The major downside of any warrant procedure would be its le-
gitimation of a horrible practice, but in my view it is better to legiti-
mate and control a specific practice that will occur, than to
legitimate a general practice of tolerating extra-legal actions, so long
as they operate under the table of scrutiny and beneath the radar
screen of accountability. Judge Posner's "pragmatic" approach
would be an invitation to widespread (and officially - if surrepti-
tiously - approved) lawlessness in "extreme circumstances." More-
over, the very concept of "extreme circumstances" is subjective and
infinitely expandable.
38
The Supreme Court of Israel has confronted a similar choice
in that nation's war against terrorism. 39 It has chosen - to an even
greater degree than our courts have in recent years - to review
virtually every emergency decision even during on-going military
operations. 40 The result was a remarkable and courageous decision
rendered by its Supreme Court on September 6, 1999, in which it
prohibited the use of physical pressure even to obtain information
deemed necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks against civil-
ians. 41 The Court's opinion, written by its President, Professor
Aharon Barak, warrants extensive quotation:
The facts presented before this Court reveal that one
hundred and twenty one people died in terrorist attacks
between 1.1.96 to 14.5.98. Seven hundred and seven peo-
ple were injured. A large number of those killed and in-
jured were victims of harrowing suicide bombings in the
heart of Israel's cities. Many attacks - including suicide
bombings, attempts to detonate car bombs, kidnappings
38. Posner has included as "extreme circumstances" the election dispute in 2000
and has justified the Supreme Court's unprincipled and lawless resolution of it. See
Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 719,
736 (2001); Compare, ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (Oxford Press 2002).
39. H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel (1999) reprinted in 38
INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 1471-90.
40. See, e.g., id.; see also H.C. 5591/02, Yassin v. Commander of Kziot Military
Camp (2002); H.C. 785/87, Abd al Nasser al Aziz v. Commander of IDF Forces (1988).
41. Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel, 38 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS at 1471-73.
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of citizens and soldiers, attempts to highjack buses,
murders, the placing of explosives, etc.- were prevented
due to the measures taken by the authorities responsible
for fighting the above described hostile terrorist activities
on a daily basis.
4 2
The decision proceeds to prohibit all forms of physi-
cal pressure including the following:
1. Making the suspect "crouch ... on the tip of his
toes for five minute intervals"
2. Making the suspect sit, handcuffed to a low chair
in the uncomfortable "Shabach position" ("the
suspect is cuffed with [one hand] placed inside
the gap between the chair's seat and back support,
while the other is tied behind him, against the
chair's back support)
3. Covering the suspect's head with a "ventilated
sack"
4. Playing "powerfully loud music"
43
The court then summarized its holding as follows:
This decision opens with a description of the difficult re-
ality in which Israel finds herself security wise. We shall
conclude this judgment be readdressing that harsh real-
ity. We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing
with that reality. This is the destiny of democracy, as not
all means are acceptable to it, and not all practices em-
ployed by its enemies are open before it. Although a de-
mocracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its
back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the
Rule of Law and recognition of an individual's liberty
constitutes an important component in its understanding
of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its
spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its
difficulties...
Consequently, it is decided that the order nisi be made
absolute, as we declare that the GSS does not have the
authority to "shake" a man, hold him in the "Shabach"
position... force him into a "frog crouch" position and
deprive him of sleep in a manner other than that which is
42. Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel, 38 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS at 1471-73.
43. Id. at 1488.
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inherently required by interrogation. Likewise, we de-
clare that the "necessity" defense, found in the Penal Law,
cannot serve as a basis of authority for the use of these
interrogation practices, or for the existence of directives
pertaining to GSS investigators, allowing them to employ
interrogation practices of this kind.
44
I know of no other Supreme Court decision acknowledging that the
restrictions it imposes on interrogation will almost certainly cost the
lives of its civilians, yet nonetheless prohibiting the use of effective,
but inhumane tactics.
45
Contrast the Israel Supreme Court decision with a decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in a
case involving two kidnappers who were holding an adult victim for
ransom.46 One of the kidnappers met the victim's brother to col-
lect the ransom, and the police arrested him and demanded that he
tell them the whereabouts of his confederate and the victim.
4 7
When he refused, the police "choked" the suspect and twisted his
arm "until he revealed where [the victim] was being held."48 One
judge characterized the police action as "rack and pinion tech-
niques. '49 Nonetheless, the court of appeals approved the actions
as necessary for "a group of concerned officers acting in a reasona-
ble manner to obtain information they needed in order to protect
another individual from bodily harm or death." 50 The Supreme
44. Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel, 38 INT'L. LEGAL MArERLmLS at 1489.
45. In light of this courageous decision, it is ironic that in May 1999 the Dutch
sections of Amnesty International publicly opposed the awarding of a human rights
prize to the author of that, and many other human rights rulings supporting Palestinian
claims on the ground that "the Israel Supreme Court's decisions with regard to human
rights . . .have been devastating." Amnesty International specifically claimed that
"Israel is the only country in the world to have effectively legalized torture." ALAN DER-
SHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 137 (2003). It should not be surprising that so many
human rights advocates have lost faith in Amnesty International's objectivity when it
comes to reporting on Israel. The real point is that "Israel is the only country in the
world" to have explicitly and directly confronted the difficult choice of evils in the tick-
ing-bomb terrorist case. It should be praised, rather than condemned for surfacing this
problem and subjecting it to open and democratic processes of review.
46. Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770 (11th Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 771.
48. Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
49. Id. at 206 (Ferguson, dissenting).
50. Leon, 734 F.2d at 772-73; See also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 124.
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Court of Israel would not have approved this police action either in
an ordinary criminal case or in a terrorist prevention situation.
The practice outlawed by the Israeli Supreme Court was simi-
lar, both in kind and degree, to that being surreptitiously employed
by the United States following September 11, 2001. The New York
Times, on March 9, 2003, reported on the "pattern" being followed
by American interrogators. 51 It includes forcing detainees to stand
"naked," with "their hands chained to the ceiling and their feet
shackled."52 Their heads are covered with "black hoods;" they are
forced "to stand or kneel in uncomfortable positions in extreme
cold or heat," which can quickly vary from "100 to 10 degrees."
53
The detainee is deprived of sleep, "fed very little," exposed to dis-
orienting sounds and lights, and according to some sources, "man-
handled" and "beaten."54 In one case involving a high-ranking al
Qaeda operative, "painkillers were withheld from Mr. [Abu]
Zubaydah, who was shot several times during his capture.
'55
A Western intelligence official described these tactics as "not
quite torture, but about as close as you can get."56 There have been
at least two deaths and twenty suicide attempts attributed to these
interrogation tactics.
57
51. Don Van Natta Jr., et al., Threats and Responses: Interrogations; Questioning Terror






57. Id. When Israel has employed similar (though somewhat less extreme) tactics,
they were universally characterized as torture, without even noting that they were non-
lethal and did not involve the infliction of sustained pain. This is what the U.N. commit-
tee Against Torture concluded in 1997:
The Committee Against Torture today completed its eighteenth ses-
sion - a two-week series of meetings marked, among other things, by a spir-
ited debate with Israel over Government-approved use during
interrogations of what it termed "moderate physical pressure" in efforts to
elicit information that could foil pending terrorist attacks. This morning
the Committee said in official conclusion that such interrogation methods
apparently included restraining in very painful conditions; holding under
special conditions; sounding of loud music for prolonged periods; sleep
deprivation for long periods; threats, including death threats; violent shak-
ing; and use of cold air to chill - and that in the Committee's view, such
methods constitute torture as defined by Article 1 of the Convention
[Vol. 48
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Intelligence officials "have also acknowledged that some sus-
pects have been turned over [by the United States] to security ser-
vices in countries known to [engage in] torture."58 These countries
include Egypt, Jordan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Mo-
rocco.59 Turning captives over to countries for the purpose of hav-
ing them tortured is in plain violation of the 1984 International
Convention Against Torture, to which we, and the countries where
we are sending the captives, are signatories.
60
The Wall Street Journal reported that "a U.S. intelligence offi-
cial" told them that detainees with important information could be
treated roughly:
Among the techniques: making captives wear black
hoods, forcing them to stand in painful "stress positions"
for a long time and subjecting them to interrogation ses-
sions lasting as long as 20 hours.
against Torture, especially when were used in combination, which it said
appeared to be the standard case.
It called, among other things, for Israel to "cease immediately" the use
of those and any other interrogation procedures that violated the Conven-
tion, and emphasized that no circumstances - even 'the terrible dilemma of
terrorism' that it acknowledged was faced by Israel - could justify torture
Members of a Government delegation appearing before the Commit-
tee contend that such methods had helped to prevent some 90 planned
terrorist attacks over the last two years and had saved many civilian lives, in
one recent case enabling members of the country's General Security Ser-
vice to locate a bomb. The delegation repeatedly denied that the proce-
dures amounted to torture.
Press Release, UN Committee Against Torture, UN Committee Against Torture
Concludes Eighteenth Session Geneva (May 13, 1997) (on file with author).
Whether the procedures previously used by Israel and currently used by the United
States did or did not constitute torture, the Supreme Court of Israel has now outlawed
them.
58. Van Natta, et al., supra note 51, at Al.
59. Van Natta, et al., supra note 51, at Al.
60. Van Natta, et al., supra note 51, at Al. An Egyptian government spokesman
"blamed rogue officers" for any abuse in his country and said "there was no systematic
policy of torture." He went on to argue, "any terrorist will claim torture-that's the
easiest thing. Claims of torture are universal. Human rights organizations make their
living on these claims." The spokesman went on to brag that Egypt had "set the model"
for antiterrorism initiatives and the United States is seemingly "imitat[ing] the Egyptian
model." When Israel too has claimed that allegations of torture made by detainees who
have provided information may be self-serving and exaggerated, Egyptian and other
authorities have insisted that the detainees must be believed. Id.
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U.S. officials overseeing interrogations of captured
al-Qaeda forces at Bagram and Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base in Cuba can even authorize "a little bit of smacky-
face," a U.S. intelligence official says. "Some al-Qaedajust
need some extra encouragement," the official says.
"There's a reason why [Mr. Mohammed] isn't going
to be near a place where he has Miranda rights or the
equivalent of them," the senior federal law-enforcer says.
"He won't be someplace like Spain or Germany or
France. We're not using this to prosecute him. This is for
intelligence. God only knows what they're going to do
with him. You go to some other country that'll let us pis-
tol whip this guy...."
U.S. authorities have an additional inducement to
make Mr. Mohammed talk, even if he shares the suicidal
commitment of the Sept. 11 hijackers: The Americans
have access to two of his elementary-school-age children,
the top law-enforcement official says. The children were
captured in a September raid that netted one of Mr. Mo-
hammed's top comrades, Ramzi Binalshibh." 6 1
There is no doubt that these tactics would be prohibited by the Is-
raeli Supreme Court, but the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia recently ruled that American courts have no
power even to review the conditions imposed on detainees in Guan-
tanamo or other interrogation centers outside the U.S.
62
This, then, is the virtue of explicitness. The Supreme Court of
Israel was able to confront the issue of torture precisely because it
had been openly addressed by the Landau Commission in 1987.63
This open discussion led to Israel being condemned-including by
countries that were doing worse but without acknowledging it. It
61. Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, How Do U.S Interrogators Make a Captured Terrorist
Talk?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2003, at B1.
62. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1142-45 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear the issue. Rasul v. Bush, 124
S.Ct. 534 (2003).
63. Symposium, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investiga-
tion of the General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, 23 ISREAL L. REv. 141,




also led to a judicial decision outlawing the practice. 64 As I demon-
strated in Why Terrorism Works, it is generally more feasible to end a
questionable practice when it is done openly rather than covertly.6 5
Professor Strauss, like many of my students, tries to evade the
classic hypothetical case of the "ticking bomb" terrorist by asserting
"that this hypothetical, almost certainly, will never happen." 66 But
what if it does? What would she have those responsible for our
safety do in the event of what she characterizes as the hypothetical
that gives [her] nightmares:
The police in New York have, in custody, a suspect known
to be a terrorist. He is adjudged perfectly lucid and ra-
tional. He admits to planting a nuclear weapon in the
heart of the city and informs the police that the bomb will
go off within five hours. Other evidence obtained by the
police make the threat totally credible. There is no possi-
bility of evacuation and no possibility of finding the
bomb, except by the most amazing stroke of luck, during
this time. Would I really argue that the state must refrain
from torture in this case?
6 7
What does she think the police would in fact do in such a situation?
All she is willing to tell us is that her decision whether to employ
torture "may turn on the definition of torture."68 She would have
"no problem" with truth serum "administered under medical super-
vision. '69 Judge Posner apparently agrees. 7° My civil liberties col-
league Harvey Silverglate, on the other hand, regards truth serum
as worse than non-lethal torture, since the former-if successful-
totally deprives the subject of all autonomy. Reasonable people
have different views regarding these horrible choices of evil. My
point is to institutionalize these preferences and debate and decide
them openly and with accountability, rather than by often emo-
tional personal biases.
64. H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel (1999), reprinted in 38
INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 1471-73.
65. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 155-160.
66. Strauss, supra note 1, at 272.
67. Strauss, supra note 1, at 272.
68. Strauss, supra note 1, at 272.
69. Strauss, supra note 1, at 272.
70. Posner, supra note 9, at 28.
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A second answer to Strauss is that variations on the "hypotheti-
cal" she assures us "will never happen" have, in fact, happened in
the Philippines, in Israel, in Germany, and in the United States.7 1
The responses to these actual cases have generally been ad hoc and
not subject to democratic review and accountability. 7 2 The ad hoc
resolution almost always results in torture being used, even in mar-
ginal cases.
Strauss also argues that:
No rule can cover every situation. What number of
anticipated casualties must be countenanced before in-
dulging in torture? How certain must the evidence
against the suspect be? How much time does the officer
have before the public is jeopardized? What method of
torture should be used? What amount of pain inflicted?
No rule can take into account all the possible variations in
these factors.
7 3
She is right. These questions are important ones, but they will need
to be asked whether a society opts for a "torture warrant" or an "ad
hoc discretionary" approach. The difference is whether these ques-
tions are asked by judges, openly and with accountability, or by low-
level functionaries, in secret and based on personal opinions.
Finally, Strauss proposes a counter-hypothetical designed to
trump the classic ticking bomb hypothetical:
The police in New York have in custody a suspect
that is a known terrorist. He is adjudged perfectly lucid
and rational. He admits to planting a nuclear weapon in
the heart of the city and that the bomb will go off within
five hours. Other evidence obtained by the police make
the threat totally credible. There is no possibility of evac-
uation, no possibility of finding the bomb except by the
most amazing stroke of luck during this time. The state
tortures this suspect-physically mutilating him until he is
near death, all to no avail. He is a fanatic and no amount
of pain inflicted upon him will cause him to thwart his
71. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 137.
72. Israel has been the exception. See supra note 39; Mordechai Kremnitzer, The
Landau Commission Report: Was the Security Service Subordinated to the Law, or the Needs of the
Secret Service, 23 ISRAEL L. REv. 216 (1989).
73. Strauss, supra note 1, at 273.
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mission. So, the police turn to the only option they have
available. They bring into the interrogation room the sus-
pect's beloved four- year- old son. And they start to tor-
ture the child. As they strip the child naked, the suspect
says nothing. They strike the child. The suspect reacts;
he is obviously tormented by the treatment of his child.
The police apply electrodes to the child's genitals. After
the child is shocked several times, the suspect caves in and
tells the police the location of the bomb.
74
This scenario would clearly fit the "ticking bomb" ex-
ception. Arguments that the "ends justify the means," or
defense of others could easily justify such an action. Yet a
nation that intentionally and brutally harms an innocent
child has clearly lost it's moral bearings. The United
States should not become such a nation.
75
I agree. But I believe we are more likely to become such a nation if
we leave decisions of this kind to the uncontrolled discretion of
those whose only job is to protect us from terrorism and who are
paid to believe that the ends always justify the means. There is
some evidence to suggest that I am right. We know that Jordan,
which denies that it ever uses torture, has, in fact, tortured the in-
nocent relatives of suspected terrorists. 76 We also know that when
we captured Mohammed, we also took into custody his two elemen-
tary school old children-and let him know that we had them.
77
There is a difference in principle, as Bentham noted more
than 200 years ago, between torturing the guilty to save the lives of
the innocent, and torturing innocent people. 78 A system which re-
quires an articulated justification for the use of non-lethal torture
and approval by a judge is more likely to honor that principle than
a system that discreetly and without open accountability relegates
74. Strauss, supra note 1, at 275-6.
75. Strauss, supra note 1, at 276.
76. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 45, at 234. Steve Chapman, No Tortured Dilemma,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at A18.
77. Press Release, Amnesty International U.S.A., Amnesty International: Alarm at
Reports of US Interrogation Techniques, (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://www.amnes
tyusa.org/news/2003/usa03052003.html.
78. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 250 (citing W.L. Twining & P.E. Twining,
Bentham on Torture, NORTHERN IRELAND LEGAL QUARTERLY (1973)).
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these decisions to law enforcement agents whose only job is to pro-
tect the public from terrorism.
As I pointed out in Why Terrorism Works, several important val-
ues are pitted against each other in this conflict.79 The first is the
safety and security of a nation's citizens. 80 Under the ticking bomb
scenario this value may be thought to require the use of torture, if
that were the only way to prevent the ticking bomb from exploding
and killing large numbers of civilians. The second value is the pres-
ervation of civil liberties and human rights. 8' This value requires
that we not accept torture as a legitimate part of our legal system.
In my debates with two prominent civil libertarians, Floyd Abrams
and Harvey Silverglate, both acknowledged that they would want
non-lethal torture to be used if it could prevent thousands of
deaths, but they did not want torture to be officially recognized by
our legal system.82 As Floyd Abrams put it: "In a democracy some-
times it is necessary to do things off the books and below the radar
screen." 83 Former presidential candidate Alan Keyes took the posi-
tion that although torture might be necessary in a given situation, it
could never be right.84 He suggested that a president should author-
ize the torturing of a ticking bomb terrorist, but that this act should
not be legitimated by the courts or incorporated into our legal sys-
tem.85 He argued that wrongful and indeed unlawful acts might
sometimes be necessary to preserve the nation, but that no aura of
legitimacy should be placed on these actions by judicial imprima-
tur.s 6 This understandable approach is in conflict with a third im-
portant value: namely, open accountability and visibility in a
democracy. "Off-the-book actions below the radar screen" are anti-
thetical to the theory and practice of democracy.87 Citizens cannot
79. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 151.
80. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 151.
81. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 151.
82. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 151. Silverglate believes that even in such a
situation the torturer should be prosecuted and the jury would almost certainly acquit.
83. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 151.
84. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 151-52. See also debate between Alan Keyes &
Alan Dershowitz on "torture," available at http://www.renewamerica.us/show/tran
scripts/02_02_04akims htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
85. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 151-52.
86. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 152.
87. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 152.
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approve or disapprove of governmental actions of which they are
unaware. We have learned the lesson of history that off-the-book
actions can produce terrible consequences. Former President Rich-
ard Nixon's creation of a group of "plumbers" led to Watergate,
and former President Ronald Reagan's authorization of an "off-the-
books" foreign policy in Central American led to the Iran-Contra
scandal.8 8 And these are only the ones we know about!
Perhaps the most extreme example of this hypocritical ap-
proach to torture comes-not surprisingly-from the French expe-
rience in Algeria. The French army used torture extensively in
seeking to prevent terrorism during France's brutal war between
1955 and 1957.89 An officer who supervised this torture, General
Paul Aussaresses, wrote an account of what he had done and seen,
including the torture of dozens of Algerians. 90 "The best way to
make a terrorist talk when he refused to say what he knew was to
torture him," he boasted. 91 Although the book was published de-
cades after the war was over, the general was prosecuted-but not
for what he had done to the Algerians. Instead, he was prosecuted
for revealing what he had done, and seeking to justify it.92
In a democracy governed by a rule of law, we should never
want our soldiers or president to take any action, which we deem
wrong or illegal. A good test of whether an action should or should
not be done is whether we are prepared to have it disclosed-per-
haps not immediately, but certainly after some time has passed. No
legal system operating under the rule of law should ever tolerate an
"off-the-books" approach to necessity. Even the defense of necessity
must be justified lawfully. The road to tyranny has always been
paved with claims of necessity made by those responsible for the
security of a nation. Our system of checks and balances requires
that all presidential actions, like all legislative or military actions, be
consistent with governing law. If it is necessary to torture in the
ticking bomb case, then our governing laws must accommodate this
practice. If we refuse to change our law to accommodate any par-
88. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 152.
89. PAUL AUSSARESSES, SERVICES SPECIAUX, ALGERIE 1955-1957 (2001).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Suzanne Daley, France is Seeking a Fine in Trial of Algerian War General, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at 6.
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ticular action then our government should not take that action. 93
Requiring that a controversial action be made openly and with ac-
countability is one way of minimizing resort to unjustifiable means.
93. The necessity defense is designed to allow interstitial action to be made in the
absence of any governing law and in the absence of time to change the law. It is for the
non-recurring situation that was never anticipated by the law. The use of torture in the
ticking bomb case has been debated for decades. It can surely be anticipated. ALAN M.
DERSHOWlTZ, SHOUTING FiRE 474-76 (Little Brown 2002).
In the 1984 case of Leon v. Wainwright, the court did not find it necessary to invoke
the "necessity defense," since no charges were brought against the policemen who tor-
tured the kidnapper, but it described the torture as having been "motivated by the
immediate necessity to find the victim and save his life." 734 F.2d at 770 (emphasis
added). If an appellate court would so regard the use of police brutality - torture - in a
case involving one kidnap victim, it is not difficult to extrapolate to a situation in which
hundreds or thousands of lives might hang in the balance.
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